§1. INTRODUCTION
Form follows function is a principle associated with modernist architecture and industrial design in the 20 th century. Th e principle is that the shape of a building or object should be primarily based upon its intended function or purpose. However, in the eyes of many national judges and legal practitioners, the EU judicial architecture lacks comprehensibility. To them, the EU 'building' is reminiscent of the alienating drawings of the famous Dutch graphic artist M.C. Escher ('Strange Loops'). Th ey cannot fi nd the entrance (nor the exit) and fall through ceilings on staircases that only go up. Th e EU architecture seems to shout at judges to keep out, instead of welcoming them to enter the building. Hereaft er I will further elaborate on these impressions (Section 2.B.) that are indeed alarming, especially because national judges enforce EU law at the fi rst and last instance. Misunderstandings about the interpretation and validity of primary and secondary EU law can seriously hamper the eff ective application of EU law ('eff et utile') at the national level.
Th e key instrument to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU law by national courts and tribunals is the preliminary ruling procedure. Th is procedure 2 was designed in the 1950s in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community, which was quite diff erent from the current Union. Th erefore the question is justifi ed if the preliminary ruling procedure takes suffi ciently into account the current dynamics at play.
In 2014, the Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law published a Legal Debate on reforming the operation of the Court of Justice of the EU. Th e debate contained contributions by fi ve authors. Eleanor Sharpston (Advocate General, CJEU) wrote about how to make the Court of Justice more productive without encroaching on the quality of its decision-making. Sacha Prechal (Judge, CJEU) refl ected on the 'responsabilization' of the national courts when submitting their requests to the Court of Justice. Michal Bobek (Professor of European Law, College of Europe) wrote about the experiences of the judiciary in the Central and Eastern European Countries. Eric Gippini-Fournier (Legal Service, European Commission) drew attention to the operation the General Court. Finally, Professor Monica Claes of Maastricht University drew the diff erent pieces together and provided her concluding remarks on this topic.
In this essay I will discuss the preliminary ruling procedure from the viewpoint of a national appeal court judge, from time to time using my own experiences with (and appreciation of) the procedure. §2. NATIONAL JUDGES' EXPERIENCES WITH EU LAW
A. THE WALLIS REPORT (2008)
In a 2008 Resolution 'on the role of the national judge in the European judicial system' 3 (based on the 'Wallis Report'), 4 the European Parliament called for a reinforced dialogue 2 Article 41 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community: 'When the validity of acts of the High Authority or the Council is contested in litigation before a national tribunal, such issue shall be certifi ed to the Court, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction to rule thereon'. 
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between national judges and the Court of Justice. A survey among national judges carried out for the purposes of the Resolution highlighted signifi cant disparities in national judges' knowledge of EU law across the European Union. Th e survey indicates that many judges perceive EU law as excessively complex and opaque. Judges also lack familiarity with the preliminary ruling procedure, partly as a result of diffi culties in accessing specifi c and up-to-date information on EU law. Th erefore, the initial and lifelong training of national judges in EU law must be intensifi ed and improved. Th e survey also found the urgent need to enhance the overall foreign language skills of national judges.
B. JUDGES' DIFFICULTIES WITH EU LAW
Th ere is good reason to assume that national judges who (as the Wallis Report shows) consider themselves 'lost' in the EU building, will consequently make incorrect use of EU law. In my view, however, this assumption needs some refi nement.
It is remarkable that in most European countries, judges seem more at ease with the application of case law from the European Court on Human Rights in Strasbourg (ECtHR). Most diffi culties that are mentioned in the 2008 Resolution of the European Parliament also apply to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Th e ECtHR's judgments are only 5 available in English (and French) and national judges cannot (yet) 6 ask the Court for explanation about the meaning and the right application of the Convention in individual cases. 7 And while the Court of Justice with its rulings aims at a very precise and erga omnes explanation of the application or validity of a specifi c EU law provision, the ECtHR rather focuses on the factual circumstances of the parties involved. Only seldom can the judges of the ECtHR be seduced to rule in such a general way that the right application of the Convention is self-evident to other Contracting Parties. Consequently, the ECtHR's case law contains many black holes and uncertainties.
For a better understanding of national judges' diffi culties with EU law, we should distinguish between judges' problems that relate to the infrastructure of the EU judicial system, and judges' problems with the application of substantive EU law. Unlike the ECHR, the EU judicial system presents itself rather poorly to legal professionals. Th is is in my belief a core problem that must be addressed by the EU architect who should provide for better routing in the judicial system. Th e basic tools alone that legal professionals must work with (the Treaties) need constant renaming and renumbering. We have underestimated that in a complex and ongoing federalizing law system such as the EU, the fi rst thing that national judges and lawyers need is structure, overview and legal certainty.
Having said that, it is probably not the application of substantive EU law by national judges that is most worrisome. Judges who specialize in intellectual property, labour, tax, and immigration law are in general rather positive about the clear guidance of the Court of Justice in concrete cases. 8 Considering the small number of inadmissibility decisions 9 of the Court, national judges seem to work quite eff ectively with the preliminary ruling procedure. Judges may not have a good overview of the EU judicial system, but they seem to manage relatively well on the micro scale when they apply EU law to specifi c areas of law. It is true however that the style and content of the Court's judgments is of particular concern to many judges. 10 
C. THE NEED FOR A REINFORCED DIALOGUE
Th ere is however room for improvement of the preliminary ruling procedure. Much has been written about the need for cooperation and a (reinforced) dialogue between the Court of Justice and national courts. National judges consider the procedure very much a one-way Q&A procedure that lacks timely exchange of new relevant information. For this reason, the 2008 European Parliament Resolution calls on the Court to consider all possible improvements to the preliminary ruling procedure which would involve the referring judge more closely in its proceedings, including enhanced possibilities for clarifying the reference and participating in the oral procedure. 11 (In the Netherlands, we call the silent period between a court's reference and the Court of Justice's ruling the 'black hole'.) Misunderstandings about a reference oft en come to light in the Advocate General's Opinion. Unlike the government and the parties involved, judges cannot 8 It follows from the 2008 Wallis Report (p. 23) that a large majority of respondents (89%) found the CJEU's ruling readily applicable to the facts of the case, thus enabling a reasonably unproblematic conclusion to the preliminary reference procedure. In 2014, the Court of Justice declared 26 references inadmissible (Hungary 8; Italy 4; Poland 3; Bulgaria 2; France 2; Romania 2; Slovakia 2; Croatia 1; Germany 1; Portugal 1). In six cases, the reference did not contain the relevant fi ndings of fact as determined by the referring court or tribunal, or an account of the facts on which the questions are based. In the other cases, the Court of Justice had no jurisdiction to hear and determine a case (19) or the application was manifestly inadmissible because of the hypothetical nature of the reference (1).
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Th e reasoning of the Court of Justice is oft en considered too general or abstract to be properly applied to the facts of national cases. Wallis Report, p. 26. communicate with the Court and they have no other recourse to damage control. Considering the average time of 16 months taken by the Court to answer a reference, this is a missed opportunity in terms of the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of both the procedures at the Court and at home. In return, Sacha Prechal, from the perspective of the Court, points at the numerous vicissitudes in judicial proceedings, such as settlement by the parties, the applicant's withdrawal or a setting aside of the reference on appeal. 12 Unfortunately, this information does not always come to light in time to prevent timeconsuming and unnecessary eff ort on the Court's part.
From the standpoint of the national court (and the Court of Justice) it is important that they can, in a timely fashion, exchange new relevant information, especially in case of misunderstandings about the referred questions. To date, the Rules of Court do not provide for a formal opportunity for comments from the referring judge. It would be most helpful if this possibility was introduced. Before the Court of Justice reformulates any part of a reference ('the referring court seeks, in essence, to ascertain whether (…)') this might be a ground for the Court to consult the referring judge.
Th e problem of extended argument
Th e need for better communication between national courts and the Court of Justice during the time that a case is pending in Luxembourg will probably become even more pressing in future. In her contribution, Advocate General Sharpston expresses concern with the quality of preliminary rulings because the authority of the Court depends on the quality of its output. 13 Th e continuing drive for speed has come at a cost. In her view, a 'productive' court produces 'well-reasoned judgments that are consistently of high quality delivered within a reasonable time'. 14 As the EU is expanding its ambit to areas that used to belong to the realm of national law (like criminal and immigration law), we may expect more rulings from the Court that will not lend themselves to an immediate clarifi cation and will not ensure a uniform interpretation and application of EU legislation. EU law in new -and politically controversial -areas relatively oft en gives rise to diffi culties in interpretation at the national level. In the fi eld of immigration law, the EU is now grappling with highly controversial concepts to prevent misuse of asylum claims. declared sexual orientation of an applicant for asylum. 15 Th e need to refer the question was unavoidable in the light of Article 4(3)(c) of Directive 2004/83/EC. 16 Yet the very 'concept' of homosexuality is historically and sociologically dubious. 17 Consequently, it has been argued that Europe's asylum determination authorities already know what procedures are lawful and what they are prohibited from doing, but the Court's judgment did not guide them in any way on how to lawfully prove a gay asylum claim. 18 For this reason, in 2010, Storey advocated the engagement of national judges in a 'transnational dialogue' in asylum cases because the Court's judges -'who are not specialized in this matter' -would be unfi t to deal with cases related to the Refugee Convention. It would take too long before national judges are aff orded with a signifi cant (and convincing) body of Court of Justice case law. 19 Also, the Wallis Report encourages the specialization of Court of Justice judges and to create specialized chambers to make the Court's judgments more 'acceptable' to specialized national judges. 20 
Application of EU law under pressure
In my opinion, the mere fact that a Court of Justice judgment may occasionally produce extended argument does not mean that the Court is not satisfactorily discharging the function of assisting the national court. To a certain extent, further adjustment of its case law will be unavoidable. However, the phenomenon of extended argument can become problematic because it bears the risk that national judges will refrain from asking for further clarifi cation for the sake of expedience (a requirement set by both national and international (also EU) law). 21 National judges will consider this as responsible thinking under the Rule of Law (which may indeed lead to an occasional in dubio pro reo approach of EU law). Th is is all the more true in cases that involve detainees (whether they are suspects in pretrial detention or aft er conviction, or asylum seekers (including children) pending immigration procedures). 22 Th is tension between the correct application of EU law and the need for a speedy decision is materialized in a (much criticized) memo addressed to the lower administrative courts of the Netherlands in 2013. Dutch judges are being asked to send a reference for a preliminary ruling fi rst to the relevant administrative Supreme Court, suggesting some informal monitoring by higher courts. In practice, however, neither the lower courts nor the supreme Dutch courts comply with the procedure laid down in the memo. 23 §3. MISUSE OF THE PRELIMINARY RULING PROCEDURE?
I will briefl y mention -as an aside -the supposed misuse by judges of the preliminary ruling procedure that is referred to in the legal debate. Diff erent authors have argued that, since EU law is primarily based on decentralized enforcement, the most powerful -and for the Court of Justice the most dangerous -means whereby the national courts can show their dissatisfaction is by ignoring the ECJ's rulings. 24 Th e way national courts understand the preliminary procedure and the way they use it, or abstain from using it, is sometimes viewed as a 'barometer' of their support of the Court of Justice's case law. 25 In academia, we fi nd diff erent reasons for non-compliance with the preliminary ruling procedure. As early as in 1987, Dauses argued (under the Article 177 procedure of the EEC Treaty) that national courts of last instance 'shelter' behind the acte clair doctrine and that lower courts justify their inclination to decide cases on their own by citing the optional nature of the reference procedure. Th is tendency 'to avoid where possible' the procedure would be encouraged by the attitude of the parties to the proceedings that fear 'unnecessary' prolongation of the proceedings or an additional element of uncertainty. 26 Also, Tridimas argued in 2003 that the Court is increasingly facing a problem of national 'judicial pluralism': national judges sometimes apply their national internalized 22 Of course, there is recourse to the urgent preliminary ruling procedure. And although that procedure can bring back delays considerably, it does not take into account an important side-eff ect of a national reference; a lack of clarity of EU legislation in one case will probably aff ect many other cases that will also be put on hold. notion of EU law or do not always share the Court's view that EU law reigns supreme over the national constitutions. 27 Bobek adds a new dimension to the debate. In a number of cases in new Member States like Poland and the Czech Republic, the reference procedure would be misused as a 'tool' for direct attack and rebellion of national judges vis-à-vis their national superior courts. 28 Th is fi nal category of cases also rather indicates an internal problem in the Member States.
I fi nd it diffi cult to value suggestions of judges' avoidance and disobedience of EU law, or national rebellion. Th e Wallis Report does not mention disobedience of EU law as a problem -let alone a major problem for EU law. From the report it follows that judges throughout Europe on the whole are well aware (and convinced) of the need and obligation of Article 267(3) of the TFEU and of the exceptions that have been established in (and aft er) the well-known Cilfi t judgment. 29 Second, we must be careful when extrapolating experiences with a few high profi le cases to the vast body of the Court of Justice's case law. Most of the reported cases of 'rebelling' judges involve sensitive constitutional issues in the Member States. 30 Looking however at the number and nature of references made by national courts to the Court, the majority involve highly detailed (and oft en extremely boring) questions about substantive EU legislation (like the tariff classifi cation of frozen camel meat from farm-raised animals). 31 §4. FORM FOLLOWS FUNCTION: CONCLUDING REMARKS I return to Louis Sullivan's 'pervading law' that form ever follows function. If today the function of the preliminary ruling procedure is indeed to enable the courts and tribunals of the Member States to ensure uniform interpretation and application of EU legislation, then what form should the procedure take, considering the dynamics at play? It is safe to presume that the architects who designed the preliminary ruling procedure in the 1950s did not foresee that the Court of Justice would ever be asked to rule on, for example, the level of evidence needed to 'establish' an asylum seeker's sexual orientation, 32 or if an organism 'which is incapable of developing into a human being may be patented for industrial or commercial purposes.' 33 In other words, the subject matter of the questions 157 referred by national judges to the Court has changed dramatically over time (Section 2.C.1). With more high profi le cases involving human rights protection coming up we may expect more debates surrounding EU law in the Member States, more visibility of EU legislation and, as a result, more active involvement of national judges and also more use of the preliminary ruling procedure. What did not change is that national judges expect clear, 'digital' answers from the Court of Justice on the application or validity of EU law. If we do not want these expectations to become unrealistic (Section 2.C.), then we must start with making the dialogue between national judges and the Court of Justice of the EU an eff ective and timely exchange of relevant information.
